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Abstract 
This paper analyses corporate investment decisions in France and Spain, focusing on the 
role of financial constraints in explaining investment behaviour. For this purpose, we take 
advantage of very carefully harmonised data sets that allow for the use of variables 
homogeneously defined in both countries. The information used consists of two panel data 
sets of industry firms selected from those reporting information to the Central Balance Sheet 
Offices of the Banque de France and of the Banco de España over the period 1991-1999. 
So as to test for the existence of liquidity constraints, we conduct a test of excess sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow using a standard Euler equation model. More precisely, both the 
theoretical model and the testing strategy used in this paper closely follow Bond and Meghir 
(1994). These authors present an empirical model of investment based on the Euler 
equation of an extended version of the standard neoclassical model of investment. This 
model assumes that the firm faces a hierarchy of costs for the alternative sources of finance 
and leads to different characterisations of investment behaviour for firms pursuing different 
financial policies. Overall, our results suggest that there are significant differences in 
investment behaviour which are closely linked to the financial situation of firms. In particular, 
the evidence found is consistent with the investment expenditure of firms paying zero 
dividends being constrained by the availability of internally generated funds.  
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of the determinants of investment behaviour has long been a key research field 
in macroeconomics. On one hand, investment spending by firms determines the future 
productive power of the economy. On the other, fluctuations in investment spending, which is 
far more volatile than consumption spending, are a driving force of the business cycle. In this 
respect, the sizeable volatility of investment as an important contributor to aggregate 
economic fluctuations has often been used to motivate studies on investment behaviour. In 
particular, within the empirical literature on company investment, the role of financial factors 
in explaining business fluctuations is a topic that has merited substantial research1. The 
recent econometric research on the relevance of liquidity constraints for investment 
spending has relied on a growing body of theoretical work studying informational 
imperfections in credit markets. At the same time, this literature has helped explain large 
fluctuations in investment as a response to small shocks. In this sense, some recent models 
have highlighted the role of financial market conditions in propagating relatively small 
shocks2. 
The increasing availability of panel data sets has been an essential element for the 
development of microeconometric research on the links between real and financial 
decisions. In particular, panel data allow a researcher to adequately test the cross-sectional 
implications of the models assuming problems of asymmetric information between borrowers 
and lenders. Moreover, the use of micro data has several additional advantages: more 
adequate measures of the variables of interest can be obtained; cross-sectional variation 
improves the precision of the estimates; and the potential biases arising from aggregation 
across firms, simultaneity or omitted variables may be better addressed3. Nevertheless, the 
use of individual data also entails some problems: the most common of these are the implicit 
biases in the composition of the samples and the usually short time dimension of the panels. 
                                                 
1 See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for recent surveys of this literature. 
2 See, for instance, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
3 See Hsiao (1986) for the potential advantages of the use of panel data, Blundell, Bond and Meghir (1996) and 
Bond and van Reenen (2002) for excellent surveys of the microeconometric literature on company investment, 
and Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) for a collection of papers on investment behaviour based on the use of panel 
data sets. Finally, within the Monetary Transmission Network of the Eurosystem, several papers have focused on 
the link between monetary policy and investment using microeconomic data sets: Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen 
(2001), Chatelain et al. (2001), Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and Generale (2001), von Kalckreuth (2001), 
Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) and Valderrama (2001). 
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Within this strand of the literature dealing with the microeconometric modelling of 
investment, several recent papers have addressed the challenge of establishing cross-
country comparisons in the analysis of the role of financial factors in company investment 
decisions4. The aim of these papers is to identify cross-country differences in the impact of 
financial constraints on investment and to link these differences to specific characteristics of 
the countries (in particular, on the financial systems). But cross-country studies face the 
difficulty of harmonising information drawn from national sources which, in most cases, 
follow different accounting rules5.  
In this paper, we analyse corporate investment decisions in France and Spain, focusing on 
the role of financial constraints in explaining investment behaviour. For this purpose, we take 
advantage of very carefully harmonised data sets that allow for the use of variables 
homogeneously defined in both countries. More precisely, the information used consists of 
two panel data sets of industry firms selected from those reporting information to the Central 
Balance Sheet Offices of the Banque de France and of the Banco de España over the period 
1991-1999. Harmonisation of databases is a key issue in cross-country comparative studies, 
since the removal of differences in accounting practices is a necessary condition to interpret 
differences in results as real differences in behaviour. 
So as to test for the existence of liquidity constraints, we conduct a test of excess sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow using a standard Euler equation model. The choice of this 
methodological approach is justified by the fact that this model, by implicitly controlling for all 
expectational influences, is less affected by the usual criticism to the excess sensitivity to 
cash flow tests (cash flow proxies demand shocks rather than indicating the existence of 
liquidity constraints). More precisely, both the theoretical model and the testing strategy used 
in this paper closely follow Bond and Meghir (1994). These authors present an empirical 
model of investment based on the Euler equation of an extended version of the standard 
neoclassical model of investment. This model assumes that the firm faces a hierarchy of 
costs for the alternative sources of finance and leads to different characterisations of 
investment behaviour for firms pursuing different financial policies. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on investment with 
financing constraints. Section 3 describes the main features of the structural model of firm 
investment, derived in Bond and Meghir (1994), which is based on the Euler equation 
                                                 
4 See Bond et al. (1997), Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (1999), Bond, Harhoff and van Reenen (1999), Chatelain et 
al. (2001), Laeven (2001) and Love (2001) for cross-country microeconometric studies on company investment. 
5 CECB (2000) illustrates the difficulties inherent to the task of harmonising accounting data from different 
countries. 
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methodology. Section 4 presents the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis. Section 5 provides the main results on the testing of the empirical 
implications of the hierarchy of finance model. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 
6. 
2. Investment, financing and asymmetric information: theoretical 
considerations 
2.1. The relevance of financial conditions for investment decisions 
The perfect capital market assumption, on which empirical investment models have 
traditionally been based, implies that in a world without taxes it is irrelevant for firms to 
decide between internal and external resources when financing their investment projects. 
The existence of asymmetric information between fund suppliers and borrowers implies the 
break-up of the irrelevance of the decision between internal and external financing. There 
are alternative microfoundations for the link between firms’ financial structure and their 
investment spending. Among the most important are distortionary taxation, transaction costs 
and the costs of financial distress. Building information asymmetries and/or distortionary 
taxation into credit-market modelling has yielded two kinds of results, which complement 
each other, with a direct impact on firms' investment behaviour. First, the most widespread 
conclusion of these models is that the cost of external funds faced by each firm depends on 
its financial condition. Second, some of these models conclude that, under certain 
circumstances, the existence of incomplete information on the quality of firms’ investment 
projects translates into lenders failing to adjust interest rates to the particular situation faced 
by each firm while imposing, instead, quantitative constraints on the volume of credit 
granted. These results warrant the relevance of financial structure as a determinant of firm 
investment. 
The first of the above results, namely the dependence of external financing costs on the 
firm’s financial condition, is the most widespread forecast in the vast literature6 incorporating 
the existence of asymmetric information in credit market modelling. According to these 
works, information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers warrant the existence of a 
spread or premium between the costs of external and internal resources. This premium may 
be capturing, among other factors, the monitoring costs –associated with the existence of a 
risk of failure– that investment projects entail for lenders. Moreover, the above-mentioned 
                                                 
6 Two frequently mentioned examples of such literature include Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1993).  
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literature suggests that this external finance premium depends on the borrower’s financial 
condition. Thus, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) present a model where such a premium 
depends conversely on the net wealth that can be provided as collateral. The larger the 
collateral in relation to the volume of credit, the fewer the incentives for the borrower to 
embark on risky investment projects. Alternatively, in other works, including Bond and 
Meghir (1994), and Alonso-Borrego (1994), the external financing cost is shown as a 
function of the level of indebtedness by capital unit. Besides, Estrada and Vallés (1998) test, 
for Spain, a model that considers the net indebtedness level as a determinant of the external 
financing cost. 
As regards the second result –the existence of credit rationing—its rationale is founded on 
the incapacity of credit suppliers to observe the returns on investment projects. The 
likelihood of the credit not being repaid makes lenders’ expected returns depend not only on 
the interest rate set, but also on the risk associated with the projects they finance. As noted 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), changes in the interest rate set by lenders may have a dual 
effect on the average risk of their credits as a whole. First, the adverse selection effect 
(whereby firms taking higher risks and considering the likelihood of repaying their credits 
rather low are the most willing to accept higher interest rates) leads to a situation where 
lenders, if they decide to raise the interest rate, end up financing firms that take higher risks. 
On the other hand, there is an incentive effect, whereby increases in interest rates may 
induce firms to embark on projects with fewer possibilities of success but more potential 
returns. For all these reasons, it can be accepted that the interest rate maximising the credit 
suppliers’ expected returns (r*) is such that credit demand exceeds credit supply (i.e. they 
set up a lower interest rate than the rate that would balance the demand for and the supply 
of lending funds). In other words, if lenders raise the rates they set above r*, the increase in 
induced average risk is such that their expected returns decrease. Thus, equilibrium in the 
market for credit can be characterised by rationing. 
This kind of model is observationally equivalent to those suggesting that the spread between 
the costs of internal and external financing depends on the firm’s financial condition, insofar 
as they forecast that funds availability for each company will depend on observable 
characteristics reflecting such condition. Therefore, in a group of firms having investment 
projects with similar expected returns, constraints will apply to those with weaker financial 
conditions (according to certain observable characteristics). Thus, Gertler (1988), and 
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990) note that access to external financing will depend on agents’ 
net wealth. 
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In sum, models incorporating the existence of asymmetric information between fund 
suppliers and borrowers (or alternatively, the existence of distortionary taxes on the different 
sources of funds) reveal the influence of agents’ financial condition on the terms of access to 
external financing (cost and availability). Consequently, firms' investment behaviour will be 
subject to their financial conditions. In particular, when information asymmetries exist, the 
neoclassical investment model provides a partial view of agents' behaviour, since the 
investment level will depend not only on the capital path that the firm wants, but also on its 
financing possibilities7. Thus, this theoretical approach allows for the introduction of financial 
variables into the investment equations. The two variables most frequently used in empirical 
studies are the level of indebtedness and, above all, internal resource generation capacity. 
Indebtedness has been used as an indicator of the firm’s financial soundness which, as 
mentioned above, can condition the cost of its external resources or access thereto. Along 
these lines, the seminal work of Bond and Meghir (1994) considers the cost of external 
resources as an increasing function of the debt ratio. However, empirical studies have not 
always confirmed this relationship. Thus, Mato (1989), for instance, finds a negative 
influence of the indebtedness ratio on the cost of external resources and mentions, among 
other possible reasons, that this ratio is not exogenous but is, in turn, a decreasing function 
of their cost. 
2.2. Sensitivity of investment to the internal generation of resources 
Undoubtedly, the financial variable most used in investment equations based on the 
existence of asymmetric information has been cash flow, i.e. self-financing capacity. This 
variable, insofar as it reflects the funds available to the firm, is expected to be positively 
correlated to the investment level. Besides, it is expected that this positive effect on 
investment of variables measuring the capacity to generate own resources will reveal itself 
more clearly in those firms where asymmetric information problems are more pronounced. 
Moreover, this positive correlation is reinforced, as Fazzari and Athey (1987) show, due to 
the self-financing capacity acting as an indicator of the financial soundness of the firm. 
Therefore, lenders use it to discriminate between credit borrowers, since they are not able to 
see accurately the quality of investment projects owing to the existence of asymmetric 
information.  
This basic hypothesis about the sensitivity of investment to variables which proxy the 
capacity to generate resources internally being higher for those firms subject to credit 
                                                 
7 Building information asymmetries into a perfect competition framework means that firms face an intertemporal 
problem of profit maximisation, subject in each period not only to technology availability, but also to a maximum 
debt level or to a function of the cost of external resources, increasing in some indicators of their soundness.    
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constraints has been recently tested in a wide range of works. The strategy followed has 
been to estimate investment equations for different sub-samples of firms, sorted according 
to a priori criteria that seek to identify financially constrained firms (or with relevant 
asymmetric information problems). In this vast literature, the seminal work of Fazzari et al. 
(1988) should be mentioned. It identifies as potentially constrained firms those not paying 
dividends in recent years. This type of approach has been used with alternative criteria by 
other authors: links to industrial grouping (Hoshi et al., 1989), age and size (Devereux and 
Schiantarelli, 1990, and Estrada and Vallés, 1998), firms’ credit rating (Whited, 1992) and 
dispersion in the firm’s share ownership (Schaller, 1993). In general, the division criterion par 
excellence in this literature is size, since there are several reasons suggesting that the 
consequences of asymmetric information problems are more noticeable in the case of small 
firms. Among these reasons, Caminal (1995) highlights that there are economies of scale in 
supervision and control tasks, and therefore it is more costly for borrowers to monitor small 
firms, and for firms to provide information to their lenders. Nevertheless, as argued in 
Chatelain et al. (2001), size might not be a sufficient or even correct indicator of 
informational asymmetries for some countries. 
In the recent literature, the hypothesis of the sensitivity of investment to the internal 
generation of resources has been tested using a wide range of econometric models of 
investment: from reduced-form models to the estimation of Euler equations. In all cases, the 
models are augmented with a variable measuring the self-financing capacity. The use of a 
reduced-form investment equation augmented with cash flow presents a basic limitation: it 
does not allow the sensitivity of investment to the internal generation of resources to be 
unequivocally associated with the prevalence of finance constraints or, more generally, with 
the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Under this 
approach the positive and significant coefficient of variables that approximate the self-
financing capacity in investment equations may be explained by alternative hypothesis. 
Specifically, the most usual critique of these approaches is that the cash flow variable may, 
instead of giving evidence on liquidity constraints, be approximating future investment 
opportunities. Moreover, Giner and Salas (1997) show that the result of the sensitivity of 
investment to financial variables may be due not only to the existence of finance constraints 
but also to the imperfections in the control mechanism on capital which make possible the 
channelling of monetary flows towards investment projects that reduce the value of total 
assets. These authors indicate that when there are information asymmetries between 
shareholders and managers and the latter pursue a growth target, the firm will invest to 
excess. Moreover, they point out that the investment rate of the firm that invest to excess 
shows a greater sensitivity to the generation of resources than that of the firm which does 
not over-invest, for three reasons. First, because the external capital market will not provide 
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monetary resources for the financing of projects that reduce the firm's market value. Second, 
firms' managers do not want to turn to debt financing because it would increase the 
probability of failure. Third, because the firm is less profitable, the internal generation of 
funds will also be lower and, thus, the finance constraint will be present in a greater number 
of cases. 
In the context of the excess sensitivity tests, the structural investment models, like the Q 
model or the Euler equation, display an undeniable advantage with respect to reduced-form 
investment equations. Structural models explicitly control for expectational influences on the 
investment decision. That implies that if the model turns out to be mis-specified because a 
financial variable is significant, this should not be attributed to an expectational influence.  
Nevertheless, the use of structural models for testing for the presence of financial 
constraints can be criticised. On one hand, the existence of serious measurement problems 
of some variables included in the structural models cast some doubt on the validity of the 
empirical implementation of these models. On the other, it has been claimed that adding 
financial variables to the structural models is a joint test of all the assumptions of the model 
and not only of the assumption of no financial constraints. Consequently, results from the 
empirical literature testing the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow and other 
financial variables are consistent with the existence of significant financial constraints, but 
these tests could also be detecting other sources of mis-specification in the investment 
models used. 
Some recent papers have tried to discriminate between alternative hypotheses that explain 
the significance in investment equations of the coefficient of variables measuring self-
financing capacity. First, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) propose the additional inclusion of 
working capital8, along with the above-mentioned variables, in a Q-model of investment. The 
rationale behind this proposal is as follows: if cash flow is measuring future investment 
opportunities, working capital -also positively correlated to sales and profits- should have a 
positive coefficient in the investment equation; conversely, if cash flow is evidencing finance 
constraints, working capital -which would be entering into competition with investment for a 
limited volume of resources- should have a negative coefficient in the investment equation. 
Second, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use a structural model to overcome the 
identification problem associated with distinguishing the role of cash flow as a proxy for 
future investment opportunities and as a means of alleviating credit constraints. The 
distinctive feature of their approach is the inclusion, among the determinants of investment, 
                                                 
8 They define working capital as liquid assets and stock less liquid assets and short-term debt. 
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of a predictor of future investment opportunities -called Fundamental-Q- built from a set of 
relevant variables, including cash flow. Gilchrist and Himmelberg estimate, for different sub-
samples, a specification that includes simultaneously the Fundamental-Q variable and cash 
flow, obtaining as a result that the latter only has an additional explanatory power for the 
sub-sample of firms identified a priori as financially constrained. Third, Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998) construct and estimate a structural model which incorporates financial 
frictions and which is used to identify the “fundamental” versus the “financial” determinants of 
investment. They find that investment is responsive to both fundamental and financial factors 
and that small firms and firms without bond ratings show the strongest response to financial 
factors9. 
Overall, although the interpretation of the findings of the literature linking financial variables 
and investment is controversial, the empirical evidence available tends to favour the 
hypothesis of the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders10. 
Firms with relevant asymmetric information problems will face high external financing costs 
or constraints on the amount of credit demanded. 
3. The model of investment 
In this section we first present the main features of the theoretical model of investment 
derived in Bond and Meghir (1994) and we then describe their testing strategy to study the 
validity of the empirical implications of the model. The Bond and Meghir (1994) model (BM 
model in what follows) is based on the hierarchy of finance approach to corporate finance 
and provides a theoretical basis to justify the sensitivity of investment to the availability of 
internal funds usually found in the empirical literature. Basically, the BM model assumes a 
hierarchy of cost for the alternative sources of financing (i.e, internal funds have a lower cost 
than external funds) and implies a different characterisation of investment for firms facing 
different financial situations. More precisely, from the first-order conditions of the 
optimisation process of a standard neoclassical model of investment with quadratic costs of 
adjustment, they derive a Euler equation that relates investment rates in successive periods. 
                                                 
9 Laeven (2001) and Love (2001) estimate structural models based on the Euler equation for investment using 
firm-level data from large sets of countries, following the approach in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).  
10 See Kaplan and Zingales (1995) for an exception to this result. These authors focus on the sample of firms 
that Fazzari et al. (1988) consider as financially constrained and, using off-balance-sheet information, analyse 
whether firms are not effectively constrained. Paradoxically, they found that firms effectively constrained are few 
and, moreover, for these firms, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is lower. Kaplan and Zingales point out 
three possible explanations to these results: first, firms effectively constrained may be conditioned by creditors to 
reducing debt; second, the consideration of an intertemporal constraints framework may vary the allocation of 
resources generated between saving and investment; and, third, the existence of adjustment costs in the 
investment planned may condition the investment response to shocks on generated resources. 
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They show that for the firms which are liquidity-constrained, the standard Euler equation is 
not a valid model to describe investment behaviour. In the model, a firm is liquidity-
constrained if it generates insufficient net revenue to finance all the investment it would be 
optimal at the cost of retained earnings and it does not find optimal to issue new shares. 
However, for those firms that are not liquidity-constrained, investment behaviour is described 
by the standard Euler equation, even if those firms face a hierarchy of financial costs. 
To test the empirical implications of their hierarchy of finance model, Bond and Meghir follow 
a threefold testing strategy. First, they estimate the standard Euler equation for the whole 
sample of firms. A rejection of the model is expected due to the presence of liquidity-
constrained firms in the sample that would lead to an excess sensitivity of investment to 
measures of internal finance. Second, they estimate the basic Euler equation augmented 
with dividends or new share issues. Again, the presence of liquidity-constrained firms would 
justify the significance of these variables in the investment equation. Third, they estimate the 
Euler equation model allowing all coefficients to vary depending on their allocation to the 
different financial regimes.  
3.1. The theoretical model 
As earlier mentioned, in this section we present the main features of the hierarchy of finance 
model derived in Bond and Meghir (1994).  
The firm’s managers are assumed to maximise the present value of net distributions to 
shareholders, subject to the flow of funds identity, to the equation of motion of the stock of 
capital and to non-negativity constraints on dividend payments and new share issues. Thus, 
the optimisation problem for the firm is: 
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where tE  is the expectations operator conditional on the time t  information set tΩ , 
( )∏
=
−
++=
s
k
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t r
1
11β  is the s-period discount factor, which discounts period st +  to t , and tr  
is the firm’s nominal required rate of return between periods, itD  are dividends, γ is the tax 
discrimination parameter that determines the relative tax benefit of dividends against capital 
gains, f is a transaction charge that has to be paid per unit of new share issues, ( ).F  is the 
firm’s production function gross of adjustment costs, ( ).G  is a convex adjustment cost 
function, itL  is the labour input, itw  is the price of labour, itB  is the firm’s total debt, it is the 
interest payable on debt, itN  is the value of new shares issued, 
I
itp  is the price of 
investment goods and itp  is the price of output.  
The main elements of the BM model may be summarised as follows: 
• Two sources of discrimination between retained earnings and new share issues are 
introduced: a differential personal taxation on both sources of funds and transactions 
costs associated with new share issues. Thus, the cost of internal finance is lower 
than the cost of new share issues. 
• The introduction of debt displays three main features: a) there is a probability of 
bankruptcy; b) both this probability of bankruptcy and the interest rate on debt 
depend positively on the amount borrowed; and c) there is a tax advantage to 
borrowing. Thus, depending on the amount borrowed, the cost of debt may be: 1) 
lower than the cost of internal finance; 2) between the cost of internal finance and the 
cost of new shares; and 3) higher than the cost of issuing new shares. 
• The solution of the model allows for three possible financial regimes for a firm. In 
Regime 1 (Dt>0, Nt=0), firms generate enough cash flow to finance investment and 
pay dividends. They use debt to finance investment up to the point where the cost of 
borrowing equals the cost of internal funds. In Regime 2 (Dt=0, Nt=0), firms exhaust 
all their net revenue to finance investment and issuing shares is too costly for them. 
They can finance a higher level of investment only by borrowing. In regime 3 (Dt=0, 
Nt>0), firms exhaust their net revenue to finance investment but they have sufficiently 
attractive investment opportunities to finance part of their investment by issuing new 
shares11. 
                                                 
11 According to the BM model, firms should not simultaneously issue new shares and pay positive dividends. 
Bond and Meghir (1994) provide several explanations to justify this type of behaviour: cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of γ, transaction costs of trading shares and signaling role for dividends. 
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In this set-up, firms in Regime 2 are liquidity-constrained in the sense that a windfall increase 
in revenue would lead to a higher level of investment. However, firms in Regimes 1 or 3 
would not change their optimal levels of investment when receiving extra revenue. In the first 
case, they would pay higher dividends. In the second case, they would reduce the volume of 
share issues and, thus, they would face a lower cost of financing but they would not change 
the level of investment. 
3.2. The empirical model and the testing strategy 
Bond and Meghir show that for firms in Regimes 1 and 3 a standard Euler equation model 
(without financial regimes) should describe their investment behaviour. To implement the 
above-mentioned empirical strategy, an empirical investment specification is needed. For 
this purpose, some additional assumptions are introduced: 
• ( ).F  is constant returns to scale, so that the marginal product of capital can be 
substituted without assuming a parametric form for the production function. We assume 
that the required time to build and install one unit of capital is one period. 
• Imperfect competition in the product market is allowed for. 
• The adjustment cost function ( ).G  is of the form: ( ) 1,
2
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1, 2
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where the parameter b  reflects the importance of adjustment costs ( 0>b ). 
• The assumption of rational expectations implies that ( ) itititt XXE ε+=  , where itε  is a 
forecast error orthogonal to information available in period t . 
Using these specifications yields the following Euler equation under the null of no liquidity 
constraints: 
1ti,1ti d ++
−−−−−
+ +++







+
Π
++







+= εηβββββ
2
1,
5
1
4
1
3
2
1,
2
1,
1
1,
ti
it
it
it
it
it
ti
it
ti
it
t
ti
K
B
KK
Y
K
I
K
I
K
I
 (3.6) 
where the ratio of production to capital 
1−it
it
K
Y
controls for imperfect competition, and 
1−
Π
it
it
K
 is 
gross operating profit. The fixed firm-specific effect ηi can be interpreted as accounting for 
firms characteristics, as well as the time-invariant components of differences in, e.g., product 
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demand, capital intensity, and growth opportunities, whereas the time-specific effect 1d +t  
can be interpreted as capturing aggregate business cycles. Under the null of no financial 
constraints, it can be shown that β1≥1, β2≤-1, β3>0 (if imperfect competition), β4<0 and β5<0. 
Under the alternative of liquidity constraints, equation (3.6) is mis-specified because 
investment is related to financial conditions. More precisely, in the presence of liquidity 
constraints, investment spending should be positively influenced by revenue or cash flow. 
Thus, the expected negative sign for β4 should not be obtained under liquidity constraints. 
This fact is the basic idea behind the testing strategy of the BM model. As has already been 
mentioned, the strategy is threefold and may be summarised as follows. 
1) Estimation of the standard Euler equation for the whole sample of firms. A rejection 
of the model is expected due to the presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the 
sample that would lead to an excess sensitivity of investment to measures of 
internal finance. The usual criticism of the excess sensitivity tests (i.e. cash flow 
proxies future investment opportunities) is less relevant for the Euler equation 
approach since all relevant expectational influences should be captured by the one-
step-ahead investment forecast. 
2) Estimation of the basic Euler equation augmented with dividends or new share 
issues. Under the null of no liquidity constraints, the coefficient of the added 
variables should not be significant. Again, the presence of liquidity-constrained firms 
would justify the rejection of the null. 
3)  Estimation of the Euler equation model allowing all coefficients to vary depending 
on their allocation to the different financial regimes. For those firms that are not a 
priori liquidity-constrained, the coefficients should be in accordance with the 
predictions of the standard Euler equations.  
To control for unobserved individual effects, endogeneity of explanatory variables and the 
introduction of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors, we estimate model 
(3.6) by transforming all variables in the model using the orthogonal deviations 
transformation (see Arellano and Bover, 1995) and using a Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). If the error term εit is serially uncorrelated, lagged 
values of the right-hand variables dated t-2 and earlier would be valid instruments. However, 
if εit is MA(1), instruments dated t-2 are no longer valid. 
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4. The Samples: Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis is conducted on two panel data sets constructed from the harmonised 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of French and Spanish industrial firms. The 
French sample comprises 45111 observations (corresponding to 6965 firms) obtained from a 
database compiled by the Banque de France. The Spanish sample includes 13631 
observations (corresponding to 2208 firms) obtained from a database compiled by the Banco 
de España. In both countries, the period considered is 1991-1999. 
Table 1 displays the size composition in both samples. In general, taking the whole 
population of enterprises in both countries as a benchmark, large firms are over-represented 
in our samples. Nevertheless, although skewed towards larger firms, these samples may be 
considered as representative of the industry sector of each economy. In fact, they contain 
higher shares of small and unlisted companies than the standard databases used in the 
empirical literature. The median number of employees is 48 in France and 49 in Spain, and 
in both cases the fraction of listed companies is below 3%. Therefore, our samples seem to 
be well suited for addressing an empirical investigation of the relevance of financial frictions 
on investment decisions, since they contain a significant share of firms that are potential 
candidates to be liquidity-constrained. 
The definitions and acronyms for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for these variables. Overall, although samples were 
cleaned of outliers by removing extreme percentiles from the variables used in the 
regression, there is still a wide dispersion in most of the variables. It is worth noting that the 
Spanish sample, despite being slightly more homogeneous in terms of size, displays a 
higher dispersion in some variables. Thus, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean 
value is higher in the Spanish sample in almost all the variables. The exceptions are the 
number of employees, the external finance cost and the ratio of the gross operating profit to 
the stock of capital. The dispersion is significantly larger in the return on assets and in the 
cash stock.  
Table 4 displays the median values for the main variables for the sub-samples of firms 
defined according to the splitting criteria that is used in the following section: payment of 
dividends in two consecutive periods. This descriptive evidence seems to suggest that those 
firms that do not pay dividends are potentially liquidity-constrained. First, this table is 
consistent with the existence of an external finance premium that reflects the monitoring 
costs that investment projects entail for lenders. The more pronounced the asymmetric 
information problems between a firm and their fund suppliers are, the larger this external 
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finance premium should be. In our case, we have found that, in both countries, the median 
cost of debt is significantly higher for firms that do not pay positive dividends. In the French 
case, the difference in the median cost of debt between those firms that do not and those 
that do pay positive dividends is 0.5 p.p., whereas in the Spanish sample this difference is 
almost 2 p.p. Second, in both countries firms that do not pay positive dividends display a 
higher level of indebtedness. Again, this difference is larger in the Spanish sample. Third, in 
both countries firms that pay positive dividends have, in relative terms to their capital stock, a 
higher level of liquid assets and generate, again in relative terms to their capital stock, higher 
flows of internal funds (considering both gross operating profits or the cash-flow variable). 
Fourth, in both countries the median size of the firms paying positive dividends is larger. 
Finally, the ratio of investment to the stock of capital is again higher in both countries for 
firms paying positive dividends. 
5. Empirical Results  
As mentioned in section 3, Bond and Meghir (1994) present a direct test of the empirical 
implications of the hierarchy of finance model. Their model predicts that the same firm may 
be financially constrained in some periods but not in others; and that the firm's current 
dividend and new share issuing behaviour should signal which financial regime the firm is 
currently in. Thus, they claim that firms in the financially-constrained regime should be 
paying zero dividends and issuing no new shares in two consecutive periods, while firms in 
the unconstrained regimes should either be paying positive dividends or issuing new shares. 
In order to implement their testing strategy, we simplify the taxonomy of final regimes. We 
distinguish only two financial regimes12. Firms paying zero dividends in two consecutive 
periods are in the constrained regime; otherwise firms are classified as being in the 
unconstrained regime. We obviate the consideration of new shares issues, the main reason 
being that in both samples the proportion of firms issuing new shares is very small. 
Table 5 displays the estimates for the basic Euler equations using the complete sample in 
both countries. As already mentioned in section 3, we use GMM, include a complete set of 
time dummies and, in order to solve the estimation problem stemming from the potential 
presence of unobserved individual effects, estimate the model using the orthogonal 
deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). All the reported GMM 
estimates correspond to one-step estimates with asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. We present two columns for each country. In the first (column (1) for 
France and column (3) for Spain), the instrument set includes all the regressors dated from 
                                                 
12 In fact, Bond and Meghir (1994) also use this simplification since the number of observations in their sample 
in Regime 3 is very low. 
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t-2 to t-4.  In the second (column (2) for France and column (4) for Spain), we assume an 
MA(1) error and exclude instruments dated t-2. In both countries, there are important 
differences between the estimates in both columns. This is especially the case for the 
coefficients of the lagged investment terms (which, as Bond and Meghir argue, are more 
likely to be biased if the error term is serially correlated). Comparing both sets of estimates, 
we find that the exclusion of the most recent lags (those dated t-2) reduces the precision of 
the estimates. Nevertheless, in spite of this fact, given the tests of the validity of the 
instruments13 and since the coefficients on the lagged investment terms, although correctly 
signed, are much smaller in absolute values than the predictions of the theoretical model in 
the absence of financial constraints, we rule out instruments dated t-2 and, in what follows, 
focus on the second set of results. 
Focusing on the results in columns (2) and (4), we find that the coefficients of the lagged 
investment terms, although larger than in the estimates with instruments dated t-2, are still 
below the predictions of the theoretical model14. The coefficient of production is positive, 
indicating the existence of imperfect competition. The debt coefficient, although correctly 
signed, is far from being significant. Nevertheless, the major departure from the predictions 
of the theoretical model under the null of absence of financial frictions is the positive 
coefficient of the gross operating profit term15. The expected sign for this coefficient is a 
negative one because the gross operating profit is proxying the marginal productivity of 
capital. However, if the null hypothesis is incorrect, the availability of internal funds would 
positively affect the level of investment. Thus, a positive sign for the coefficient of the gross 
operating profit might be signaling the existence of liquidity constraints. Overall, the results in 
Table 5 provide evidence suggesting that the Euler equation model without financial regimes 
is mis-specified. 
The second step in the BM testing strategy is to estimate the standard Euler equation 
augmented with the dividends to capital ratio. Under the null of no financial regimes this 
variable should not display any significant information content for the investment decision. As 
Table 6 shows the coefficient of the dividends to capital ratio is significant (although it is only 
marginally significant in the Spanish sample), while the remaining coefficients of the model 
do not significantly differ from those reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5. Thus, this 
                                                 
13 In the French case, both the Sargan test in column (1) and the Sargan difference test support the rejection of 
the t-2 instruments. In the Spanish case, instruments dated t-2 cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
comparability with the French results and given that the point estimates –reported in column (4)- for the lagged 
investment terms are closer to their theoretical values we also focus, for the Spanish sample, on results 
excluding instruments dated t-2. The pattern of results does not substantially differ when including them. 
14 Under the null of no financial constraints, the theoretical model predicts β1≥1 and β2≤-1. 
15 This result is also obtained when using cash flow instead of gross operating profit to estimate the standard 
Euler equation model. 
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table provides some additional evidence (albeit somewhat weak) favourable to the rejection 
of the basic Euler equation model without financial regimes. 
Finally, under the hypothesis of existence of financial regimes we should expect non-linear 
behaviour of investment in the sense that estimated coefficients in accordance with the 
predictions of the standard Euler equation model without financial regimes should be found 
only for those firms that are not liquidity-constrained. However, for liquidity-constrained firms 
estimates should reflect some degree of excess sensitivity of investment to financial 
variables. Thus, in the third step of their testing strategy, BM define a dummy variable Sit that 
takes the value 1 when the firm is liquidity-constrained and interact this variable with all the 
regressors. The coefficients for the unconstrained sample are those corresponding to the 
non-interacted terms. Analogously, for the constrained sample the parameters are the 
results of the sum of the non-interacted terms with the corresponding interaction terms. 
To implement this test, in this paper we define a dummy variable Sit that is zero when 
dividends are positive in periods t and t-116. As BM do, we consider that this variable Sit is 
endogenous and, consequently, we instrument it. Finally, we only add the interaction of this 
variable with the gross operating profit to capital, since this is the most direct test for the 
absence of financial constraints. Moreover, the introduction of the complete set of interaction 
terms substantially reduces the precision of the estimates. The results are reported in Table 
7. When a different coefficient across observations in the two sub-samples is allowed for, we 
find that, in the Spanish sample, the point estimate for gross operating profit is zero for the 
unconstrained sub-sample and positive and significant for the constrained observations. In 
the French sample, the point estimate for gross operating profit is still positive and significant 
(although its size is smaller than in the model without the interaction term) for the 
unconstrained sub-sample, whereas the point estimate for the interaction term is also 
positive and significant suggesting that, as expected, the investment behaviour of firms in 
the constrained regime display a higher sensitivity to the internal generation of resources. 
Therefore, our results suggest that the rejection of a standard Euler equation model of 
investment without financial regimes comes from the presence in both samples of a sub-set 
of companies that are liquidity-constrained, in the sense that their investment is positively 
linked to the availability of internal finance.  
The main findings of the study broadly reproduce those obtained by Bond and Meghir (1994) 
using a sample of quoted U.K. manufacturing firms over the period 1974-1986. Moreover, 
                                                 
16 To allow for a signaling role for dividends, Bond and Meghir (1994) use two alternative criteria to classify a 
firm as being constrained: first, if current dividends are low relative to the firm’s average payout; and second, if 
the firm cuts dividends. 
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our results are consistent with those found in Alonso-Borrego (1994). He estimates a similar 
model for a sample of Spanish firms over the period 1987-1990. The standard Euler 
equation model is rejected for the sample containing both dividend-paying observations and 
non-dividend-paying ones. Furthermore, when the coefficients are allowed to vary depending 
on the dividend policy, a higher degree of excess sensitivity to cash flow is found for those 
firms paying zero dividends. In addition, using a two-stage procedure to correct the potential 
sample selection bias, he estimates the standard Euler equation model for the sub-sample of 
firms paying positive dividends and confirms that the model is not rejected for that sub-
sample.  
Finally, it is worth noting that Chatelain et al. (2001), estimating a neoclassical model of 
investment for two samples of firms –French and Spanish- very similar to the ones used in 
this study, rejects that small firms display a higher degree of excess sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow relative to large firms. Our results seem to confirm, as was suggested in that 
paper, that size might not be a sufficient indicator, for some countries, of informational 
asymmetries. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the role of financial constraints in explaining investment behaviour 
using two unbalanced samples of French and Spanish industry firms over the period 1991-
1999. For this purpose, this chapter has closely followed the methodological approach 
implemented by Bond and Meghir (1994). These authors present an extended version of the 
standard Euler equation model of investment. This extended model assumes that the firm 
faces a hierarchy of costs for the alternative sources of finance and leads to different 
characterisations of investment behaviour for firms pursuing different financial policies. 
Overall, our results suggest that there are significant differences in investment behaviour 
which are closely linked to the financial situation of firms. More precisely, our results 
corroborate the empirical finding that investment displays excess sensitivity to measures of 
internal finance for a sub-set of firms; in particular, the evidence found is consistent with the 
investment expenditure of firms paying zero dividends being constrained by the availability of 
internally generated funds.  
Although our results display some slight departures from the theoretical predictions of the 
extended model, they provide an empirical basis for the excess sensitivity of investment to 
financial variables. Therefore, the evidence presented contributes to explaining the rejection 
of the standard Euler equation model of investment. This model is rejected on several 
 20 BANCO DE ESPAÑA/DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.0214 
grounds. First, in the estimates of the standard Euler equation for the whole sample of firms, 
a positive and significant coefficient is found for the internal funds variable that can be 
explained by the presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the sample that would lead to an 
excess sensitivity of investment to measures of internal finance. Second, in the estimation of 
the basic Euler equation augmented with dividends, this variable turns out to be significant. 
We argue again that the presence of liquidity-constrained firms in the sample justifies this 
result. Finally, in the estimation of the Euler equation model allowing all coefficients to vary 
depending on their allocation to the different financial regimes, a higher excess sensitivity to 
internal funds is found for the a priori liquidity-constrained firms. Nevertheless, the negative 
and significant coefficient for the internal funds variable for those firms that are not a priori 
liquidity-constrained is not found. A possible explanation for the latter result, as argued by 
Bond and Meghir (1994), is that the sample selection criteria used to identify the existence of 
liquidity constraints might be somewhat weak in the sense that firms could have incentives to 
pay positive dividends. Thus, firms could decide to pay positive dividends even if liquidity-
constrained. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the patterns of results in both countries do not seem to 
display significant differences (although a formal statistical test of the differences has not 
been conducted since the databases have not been pooled). What is more telling, our 
results broadly reproduce those obtained by Bond and Meghir (1994) for a very different 
sample, namely quoted U.K. manufacturing firms over the period 1974-1986. Thus, these 
results confirm that the analysis of the dividend policy of the firms is useful for identifying the 
potential presence of financial constraints on investment spending. 
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Table 1. Size Distribution of Firms and Observations  
by Mean Employment 
 
 France 
 n ≤ 20 20<n ≤100 100< n ≤ 250 250<n≤500 n>500 Total 
No. of firms 1 083 3 894 1 141 450 397 6 965
 15.5% 55.9% 16.4% 6.5% 5.7% 100.0%
No. of obs. 6 611 25 319 7 581 2 984 2 616 45 111
 14.7% 56.1% 16.8% 6.6% 5.8% 100.0%
 
Spain 
 n ≤ 20 20<n ≤100 100< n ≤ 250 250<n≤500 n>500 Total 
No. of firms 368 1180 353 168 139 2208
 16.7% 53.4 % 16.0 % 7.6 % 6.3% 100 %
No. of obs. 2190 7260 2259 1078 844 13631
 16.1 % 53.3 % 16.6 % 7.9 % 6.2 % 100 %
  
 
Percentage of Listed Companies (Firms and 
Observations) 
 France  Spain 
 Listed Total Listed Total 
No. of firms 117 6965 64 2208 
 1.7% 100.0% 2.9 % 100 % 
No. of obs. 773 45111 359 13631 
 1.7% 100.0% 2.6 % 100 % 
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Table 2. Variable Acronyms and Definitions 
 
 
Variable Acronyms Description of Variable 
  
I/K Gross Investment / Capital = I(t)/K(t-1) 
  
S/K Sales / Capital = S(t)/K(t-1) 
  
Y/K Production / Capital = Y(t)/K(t-1) 
  
CF/K Cash Flow / Capital = CF(t)/K(t-1) 
  
CS/K Cash Stock / Capital = CS(t)/K(t-1) 
  
GP/K Gross Operating Profit / Capital = GP(t)/K(t-1) 
  
B/K Total Debt / Capital = B(t)/K(t-1) 
  
YP Number of Employees 
  
ROA Ordinary Return on Net Assets (R1) 
  
EFC External Finance Cost (R2) 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
FRANCE 
Variable Mean St. dev. Percentiles 
   Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
I/K 0.139 0.144 0.002 0.048 0.094 0.174 1.026 
S/K 4.123 3.771 0.717 2.001 3.001 4.779 79.80 
Y/K 3.718 3.488 -0.737 1.818 2.727 4.287 79.80 
CF/K 0.332 0.312 -0.652 0.161 0.262 0.411 4.219 
CS/K 0.284 0.634 0.000 0.017 0.086 0.302 26.50 
GP/K 0.196 0.302 -2.637 0.047 0.122 0.256 5.92 
B/K 0.592 0.651 0.013 0.219 0.402 0.709 9.78 
YP 169 933 1 27 48 120 63258 
ROA 0.116 0.422 -33.09 0.045 0.105 0.179 69.20 
EFC 0.084 0.527 0.00 0.046 0.064 0.089 73.00 
 
SPAIN 
Variable Mean St. dev. Percentiles 
   Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
I/K 0.148 0.184 -0.156 0.035 0.092 0.193 1.285 
S/K 4.477 4.673 0.370 1.808 3.032 5.362 64.359 
Y/K 4.538 4.676 0.348 1.841 3.094 5.362 64.359 
CF/K 0.339 0.444 -1.081 0.114 0.228 0.424 4.154 
CS/K 0.370 0.895 -0.071 0.024 0.103 0.332 19.870 
GP/K 0.409 0.441 -1.142 0.169 0.296 0.504 4.737 
B/K 0.711 0.926 0 0.140 0.447 0.918 9.858 
YP 199 769 1 26 49 131 15665 
ROA 0.130 0.782 -29.727 0.056 0.111 0.188 79.5 
EFC 0.178 0.610 0 0.064 0.105 0.161 40 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Median by Sub-samples) 
 
 FRANCE SPAIN 
     
Variable Dividends=0 Dividends>0 Dividends=0 Dividends>0 
     
Number of 
observations 
30532 14579 10771 2860 
S/K 2.938 3.138 3.016 3.100 
Y/K 2.653 2.874 3.076 3.137 
CF/K 0.222 0.351 0.194 0.377 
CS/K 0.058 0.192 0.090 0.177 
GP/K 0.134 0.216 0.273 0.396 
B/K 0.444 0.323 0.515 0.223 
YP 46 56 44 86 
ROA 0.081 0.154 0.099 0.168 
EFC 0.066 0.061 0.108 0.090 
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TABLE 5 
The basic Euler equation model 
 France Spain 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
I
−
−  
0.132 
(0.020) 
0.529 
(0.211) 
0.211 
(0.042) 
0.456 
(0.236) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
I








−
−  
-0.170 
(0.025) 
-0.777 
(0.346) 
-0.190 
(0.044) 
-0.444 
(0.325) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
GOP
−
−  0.079 (0.012) 
0.093 
(0.031) 
0.015 
(0.019) 
0.042 
(0.044) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
Y
−
−  0.014 (0.002) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
0.018 
(0.007) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
B








−
−  
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
     
m1 -32.96 -6.17 -16.54 -4.37 
m2 -0.28 -0.33 0.18 -0.44 
Sargan 92.8 39.3 74.6  35.5 
(p-value) (0.04) (0.50) (0.33) (0.67) 
Difference-Sargan 53.5 39.1 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.12) 
     
Instruments t-2, t-3, t-4 t-3, t-4 t-2, t-3, t-4 t-3, t-4 
Notes: The estimation method is orthogonal deviations GMM. Time dummies are included. mi is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences (asymptotically, this test follows 
a standard normal distribution). Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions (asymptotically 
χ2). Difference-Sargan is a test of the validity of the additional instruments (asymptotically χ2). See 
Table 2 for the definition of the variables. 
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TABLE 6 
Tests for the absence of financial effects 
 France Spain 
 (i) (ii) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
I
−
−  
0.517 
(0.211) 
0.491 
(0.221) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
I








−
−  
-0.717 
(0.344) 
-0.558 
(0.267) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
GOP
−
−  0.109 (0.032) 
0.070 
(0.045) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
Y
−
−  0.008 (0.004) 
0.016 
(0.007) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
B








−
−  
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
1it
it
K
D
−
 -0.232 
(0.101) 
-0.305 
(0.170) 
   
m1 -6.59 -5.20 
m2 -0.11 0.10 
Sargan 45.8 43.1 
(p-value) (0.56) (0.67) 
Instruments t-3, t-4 t-3, t-4 
See notes to Table 5. 
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TABLE 7 
Tests for the absence of financial regimes 
 France Spain 
 (i) (ii) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
I
−
−  
0.490 
(0.199) 
0.449 
(0.223) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
I








−
−  
-0.681 
(0.313) 
-0.413 
(0.285) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
GOP
−
−  0.069 (0.031) 
-0.001 
(0.044) 
2t,i
1t,i
K
Y
−
−  0.008 (0.004) 
0.017 
(0.007) 
2
2t,i
1t,i
K
B








−
−  
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
2it
1it
it K
GOP
S
−
−  0.041 
(0.024) 
0.106 
(0.044) 
   
m1 -6.71 -5.21 
m2 -0.06 0.60 
Sargan 40.8 43.2 
(p-value) (0.76) (0.67) 
Proportion of 
observations with Sit =0 
0.32 0.21 
Instruments t-3, t-4 t-3, t-4 
See notes to Table 5. 
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